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JUVENILE JUSTICE REFORM IN TEXAS: 
THE CONTEXT, CONTENT & CONSEQUENCES OF SENATE 
BILL 1630 
 
Sara A. Gordon* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 In 2003, Jimmy Martinez, a resident of San Antonio, entered the Texas criminal 
justice system after missing his school bus.1 Charged with truancy and destruction of 
property, Jimmy was sent to live in a county juvenile detention center for six months.2 
Five months into his sentence, he was transferred to a secure state facility four hun-
dred miles from his home and managed by the Texas Youth Commission (hereinafter 
TYC) (now the Texas Juvenile Justice Department).3  While a prisoner of that facil-
ity, Jimmy witnessed his best friend’s murder and was regularly beaten and sexually 
abused by TYC security guards.4 Several times during the course of his stay at the 
secure state facility, Jimmy was sent to the on-site hospital for serious injuries he 
sustained from the beatings.5 When pressed by Jimmy’s mother for an explanation 
of why her son kept ending up in the facility’s hospital, TYC refused to answer.6   
Jimmy emerged from his imprisonment battling both post-traumatic stress disor-
der and schizophrenia, constantly fearful and angry, and struggling with serious bouts 
of insomnia.7 When it came to answering questions about the abuse he suffered while 
in TYC custody, he would at times refuse to speak at all about his experience, and at 
other times would spontaneously talk for hours about it.8 Moreover, Jimmy struggled 
to find and keep a job, and eventually found his way back into the criminal justice 
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 1.  Tim Murphy, Rick Perry’s Juvie Record, MOTHER JONES (Sep. 2011), available at http://www.moth-
erjones.com/politics/2011/09/rick-perry-juvie-record-texas-youth-commission?page=1. 
 2.  Id. 
 3.  Id. 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Abuse and Violence in TYC Facilities, Hearing Before the Tex. Sen. Crim. Justice Comm., 2007 Leg., 
80th Sess. Interim Charge 3 (2006) (written testimony of Texas Coalition Advocating Justice for Juveniles,  4)  
available at http://www.aclutx.org/files/060905%20Juvie%20Testimony.pdf. 
 6.  Id. at 5. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id. 
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system after being arrested for burglary.9 He was then sent to a prison facility eight 
hours away from home, where his situation was made even worse.10  
 Jimmy’s story is hardly atypical. For more than a century, the archetypal model 
for the treatment, punishment, and supposed rehabilitation of juvenile offenders in 
Texas has been mostly unchanged: confinement in large correctional facilities, much 
like the one Jimmy was sent to.11 Whatever these institutions may be called—”reform 
schools,” “training schools,” “youth corrections facilities,”—the institutions them-
selves have changed very little. 12  And in Texas, the record of these large juvenile 
facilities is dismal. Dependence on them has led to consistently high recidivism rates 
(for serious and non-serious offenders alike), huge costs (typically paid for through 
taxpayer dollars), and alarmingly rampant violence and abuse inside the facilities, as 
depicted by Jimmy’s story.13 Moreover, evidence has shown that incarceration in 
these kinds of facilities has serious and lifelong negative impacts on youth.14 As 
Barry Feld writes in Bad Kids: Race and the Transformation of the Juvenile Court, 
“[a] century of experience with training schools and youth prisons demonstrates that 
they constitute the one extensively evaluated and clearly ineffective method to treat 
delinquents.”15 Yet for years, no one seemed to question the state’s nearly unwaver-
ing dependence on them.  
From the mid-1990s until 2007, the population of juveniles in secure state insti-
tutions dramatically increased in Texas, and corruption in these institutions became 
commonplace. In late 2006, at the peak of the explosive growth in both crime and 
punishment—”when about 4,800 kids were in far-flung, state-run lock-ups scattered 
across the state with even more [kids] consigned to secure county-operated facili-
ties—scandal hit.”16,17 A news story published in The Texas Observer detailed alle-
gations of child sexual abuse by staff members from across the state (many of which 
proved credible).18 In 2005, there had been similar allegations, but this particular 
news story published two years later caused the scandal to truly erupt.19 Matters were 
made worse when it became clear that nothing had been done to prosecute the ac-
cused in the 2005 case, but rather, there seemed to be an official cover-up of the 
 
 9.  Murphy, supra note 1. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  RICHARD A. MENDEL & ANNIE E. CASEY FOUNDATION, THE MISSOURI MODEL: REINVENTING THE 
PRACTICE OF REHABILITATING YOUTHFUL OFFENDERS (2010). 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  CHILDREN AT RISK, THE STATE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE IN TEXAS: A ROADMAP TO IMPROVED OUT-
COMES IN THE TEXAS JUVENILE JUSTICE  DEPARTMENT, ADULT CERTIFICATION, AND MENTAL HEALTH, 48 
(2013) available at http://childrenatrisk.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/01_The-State-of-Juvenile-Justice.pdf 
[hereinafter CHILDREN AT RISK]. 
 15.   Mendel, supra note 11. 
 16.  TEXANS CARE FOR CHILDREN, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN TEXAS: WHERE WE’VE BEEN, WHERE WE’RE 
HEADED (2012) [hereinafter TEXANS CARE FOR CHILDREN]. 
 17.  This figure does not take into consideration the juveniles in Texas who end up being certified to the 
criminal justice system and tried as adults. 
 18.  Nate Blakeslee, Hidden in Plain Sight, THE TEXAS OBSERVER (February 23, 2007), available at 
http://www.texasobserver.org/hidden-in-plain-sight/. 
 19.  Id. 
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allegations and of the corruption itself.20 Investigations ensued, high-ranking offi-
cials resigned, and the truth of just how extensive the rampant problems in the Texas 
juvenile justice system were was exposed.21 
In response to the scandals, the juvenile justice system began the long process of 
overhauling much of the TYC management, moving juvenile offenders out of the 
secure state facilities, and striving to create a system in its place more focused on 
keeping them in community-based alternatives, void of corruption and designed to 
rehabilitate. The dramatic shift in policy that resulted came in reaction not only to 
various scandals that erupted all over the state, but also to a statewide recognition of 
the drawbacks to state institutionalization and the benefits of community-based and 
individualized treatment programs. Since 2007, there has been consistent advocacy 
and reform efforts aimed at ensuring juvenile offenders would be treated and reha-
bilitated in community-based centers rather than sent away to secure state facilities.22  
 These reform efforts eventually led to the passage of Senate Bill (SB) 1630 by 
the 82nd Texas Legislature in July 2015.23 The bill’s genesis was rooted in the belief 
that the juvenile justice system in place in Texas, focused on the state model, was 
developed at a different time for a different day.24 As evidenced by the tumultuous 
and scandal-ridden history of the Texas juvenile justice system, the passage of this 
bill was a long time in the making. At the heart of the bill is a desire to place juvenile 
offenders in environments that will allow them to correct and better their lives, rather 
than placing them in environments riddled with abuse and harsh punishments.25  
Authored by Texas Senator John Whitmire, the bill, which marks the most sig-
nificant change in Texas’ juvenile justice system in years, moves the Texas Juvenile 
Justice Department to a regional model that will keep youth closer to home.26 The 
facilities at the regional level are mostly operated by counties instead of the state—
unlike the five high-security lockups that more resemble prisons than rehabilitation 
centers.27 The bill essentially ensures that state facilities will be reserved only for 
those who simply cannot be accommodated elsewhere.28   
While this bill goes farther than any previous act of legislation in terms of reori-
enting the juvenile justice system in Texas to stand on healthier ground, in many 
ways, it is simply the logical follow-up to the sweeping reforms that have been en-
acted in the state since 2007. Not only will the regional model created by this piece 
of legislation be beneficial to the youth themselves, but it is also considerably more 
 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  Tony Fabelo et al., Closer to Home: An Analysis of the State and Local Impact of the Texas Juvenile 
Justice Reforms, PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE, available at https://csgjusticecenter.org/wp-con-
tent/uploads/2015/01/texas-JJ-reform-closer-to-home.pdf. 
 23.  S.B. 1630, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015). 
 24.  Mike Ward, Reform Bill: Hold Fewer Juvenile Offenders in State Lockups, THE HOUSTON CHRONICLE 
(Mar. 13, 2015) http://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/politics/texas/article/Reform-bill-Hold-fewer-juve-
nile-offenders-in-6133197.php. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  2015 Legislative Wrap-Up and Appreciation, TEXAS CRIMINAL JUSTICE COALITION (2015). 
 28.  Id. 
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cost-efficient than the previous state model.  
Part I of this Note will provide an overview of the Texas juvenile justice system 
to help clarify the context surrounding the passage of SB 1630. Part I will be divided 
into three sections. The first will detail the Texas juvenile justice system prior to the 
1990s, when, while there were some instances of mistreatment in various state-run 
facilities, the system was largely properly focused on rehabilitative efforts. The sec-
ond section will then detail the time period beginning in the 1990s until 2007, when, 
due to dramatic spikes in the juvenile crime rate throughout the nation and especially 
in Texas, the state subscribed to “tough on crime” policies that resulted in widespread 
abuse, neglect, and corruption. These events in particular led to the abuses that re-
sulted in the passing of SB 1630. Lastly, the third section will detail 2007 until 2015 
and explain the scandal of 2007 and the resultant series of legislation passed in Texas 
aimed at restructuring the juvenile justice system. 
Part II of this Note will provide an in-depth analysis of SB 1630 by examining 
its legislative history, genesis, purposes, various components, and efficacy thus far. 
Part III will then compare Texas’ approach to juvenile justice under the bill to ap-
proaches taken in both Missouri, where a similar approach has been implemented and 
quite effective, and Louisiana, where a similar approach has been implemented but 
has not yet proven successful. Part III will conclude by predicting the probable suc-
cess of SB 1630 on the Texas juvenile justice system by examining how similar leg-
islation has played out under different approaches in both Missouri and Louisiana. 
I. THE STATE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE IN TEXAS PRIOR TO SENATE BILL 1630 
A. Pre-1990s 
The Texas Youth Commission (TYC) (now the Texas Juvenile Justice Depart-
ment) was not always reliant on high-security, state-run lockups as a way to manage 
juvenile offenders.29  Prior to the mid-1990s, the prevailing rhetoric of the Texas 
juvenile justice system praised the value of rehabilitation for juvenile offenders. The 
main differences between the Texas juvenile and adult criminal justice systems, as 
outlined in the Texas Family Code and Texas Penal Code, revolve around the fact 
that “the primary purpose of juvenile justice procedures is protection and rehabilita-
tion and for adults the goal is to punish the guilty.”30 This distinction characterized 
the juvenile justice system in its early years.   
The differences in the semantics used to describe the adult and juvenile justice 
systems’ processes correlate to deeper, more tangible differences between the two 
systems, and understanding these differences helps to illustrate the important facets 
that characterized the Texas juvenile justice system for many years.31 Some of these 
differences include: 
 
 29.  CHILDREN AT RISK, supra note 14. 
 30.  Ruby Shaw & Everette B. Penn, Purpose and Scope of the Texas Juvenile Justice System, JUVENILE 
JUSTICE 3 (6th ed. 2007), available at http://studysites.sagepub.com/juvenilejustice6study/state/tx/Chap-
ter%205.pdf. 
 31.  Id. 
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Juveniles are detained and adjudicated and adults are arrested and con-
victed; age determines the jurisdiction of the juvenile court and the nature 
of offense determines the jurisdiction of the adult court; juveniles can be 
apprehended for acts that would not be criminal if they were committed by 
an adult, such as smoking; juvenile court procedures are generally informal 
and may be private but adult court procedures are more formal and are 
open to the public. . .A juvenile who is certified as an adult cannot be sen-
tenced to death if the crime occurred before the youth was 18 years of 
age.32 
As it was established, the Texas juvenile justice system, along with all juvenile 
justice systems in the United States, was focused on rehabilitation and setting each 
juvenile offender on a path free from future crime. Despite this well-meaning and 
deeply rooted intention, the concern for safety and national trends involving spikes 
in juvenile crime resulted in frequent pushes for a more intense approach to punish-
ment, and the juvenile justice system in Texas, even prior to the mid-1990s, saw the 
outbreak of many scandals and hidden injustices throughout the various secure state 
institutions.33  
Morales v. Turman brought much of this to light.34 Morales was a landmark fed-
eral case in which Alicia Morales and eleven other teenagers sued the Texas Youth 
Council, seeking both damages and injunctive relief, for physical and mental abuse, 
segregation, and neglect suffered in juvenile detention facilities.35 Moreover, Mo-
rales was a bringing a separate due process charge because previously, in the El Paso 
juvenile court, she had been given no notice of charges brought against her, given no 
opportunity for a court appearance, and provided no legal representation.36  
In Morales, the District Court found that “constitutional rights violations were 
rampant in TYC” at the time the plaintiffs live there.37 The court, in an influential 
opinion authored by Judge Justice, ruled that many practices at TYC constituted cruel 
and unusual punishment, in explicit violation of the Eighth Amendment of the United 
States Constitution.38 Examples of these violations included: beatings, solitary con-
finement, the use of chemical crowd-control devices, and the use of drugs instead of 
psychotherapy as a means to control behavior.39,40  
 
 32.  Id. 
 33.  Id. 
 34.  Morales v. Turman, 326 F.Supp. 677 (E.D. Tex. 1971). 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Laurie E. Jasinski, Texas Youth Commission, TEXAS STATE HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION: A DIGITAL 
GATEWAY TO TEXAS HISTORY (Jun. 15, 2010), https://tshaonline.org/handbook/online/articles/mdt35. 
 37.  Shaw, supra note 30, at 9. 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. 
 40.  It is dangerous for juveniles to rely on medication alone for behavior modification for two main rea-
sons. First, medication alone often does not resolve any underlying issues that may have triggered the behavioral 
issues in the first place. And second, drugs have the potential to heavily sedate patients or produce dangerous 
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 Morales led to sweeping changes in the Texas juvenile justice system by bring-
ing to light many instances of injustice in several Texas correctional facilities.41 Re-
forms that followed this case included: the closings of two institutions, the elimina-
tion of corporal punishment, the elimination of segregation, increased staff and 
supervision of services, the establishment of clearer policies and procedures, and a 
newly adopted Student Bill of Rights.42 Additionally, specialized community-based 
alternatives and treatment programs were created, TYC-operated “halfway house” 
programs were founded, stricter staff requirements for TYC employees were estab-
lished, many youth were transferred from institutions to foster care, and a county 
assistance program was founded in order to help reduce the number of commitments 
to TYC by directing a portion of state funds to youth probation services in their local 
communities.43 By and large, the agency sought to lower recidivism rates, both as a 
means to decrease the exorbitant expense of maintaining several state-run facilities 
and to help set the once-troubled juveniles on a path to a more successful future.44   
 All of these reform efforts were part of the “back to basics” approach taken by 
the Texas juvenile justice system. The “back to basics” philosophy emphasized 
greater structure, more strictly enforced discipline, and increased accountability. The 
backbone of this new philosophy was its intent to balance public safety and punish-
ment for criminal acts with the need for rehabilitation. 
 The years prior to the mid-1990s exemplify the constant tension that existed 
between the two philosophies of rehabilitation and punishment. Although the Texas 
juvenile justice system at its founding strove to create a balance between the two 
philosophies, their efforts proved idealistic.  Morales v. Turman and the Texas Youth 
Commission’s “back to basics” philosophy were significant in establishing refined 
and more intentional practices focused on rehabilitation and on creating safer envi-
ronments both at the county-level and in the secure state institutions that continued 
to exist. Certain trends and policies that arose during the 1990s, however, caused the 
juvenile justice system to develop many characteristics and practice remiss of any of 
these measures. 
B. The 1990s—2007 
 Despite the Texas Youth Commission’s efforts to remain focused on the reha-
bilitative ideal and keeping juveniles in safer environments, an extreme spike in the 
national juvenile crime rate caused much of that rehabilitative ideal to be lost.45 From 
the late 1980s to the early 1990s, the rate of murder committed by teenagers aged 14-
 
side effects. 
 41.  William Field et al., Gatesville State School for Boys, TEXAS STATE HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION: A 
DIGITAL GATEWAY TO TEXAS HISTORY. 
 42.  Id. 
 43.  Shaw, supra note 30. 
 44.  See generally id. 
 45.  James Alan Fox, Trends in Juvenile Violence, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE 
4 (Mar. 1996), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/tjvfox2.pdf. 
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17 increased 172 percent.46 These national trends, already shocking, were outpaced 
by the trends in Texas alone.47 In Texas, between 1988 and 1993, there was a 69 
percent increase in referrals to juvenile probation for delinquent activity, and a 161 
percent increase in referrals for violent offenses.48 Texas’ juvenile homicide rate was 
almost twice the national rate in 1992, and there was a 285 percent increase in youth 
committed to the Texas Youth Commission for violent offenses.49 The spike in vio-
lent crime during this time period triggered widespread speculation and fears about 
the causes and extent of juvenile crime.50   
This apparent need to point to something—anything—as the cause of such an 
intense change in juvenile crime led to the popularity of the rather unfounded belief 
that there had been a dramatic and fundamental transformation in child develop-
ment.51 This supposed “transformation” of child development “corroded empathy 
and morality, spawning a new generation of remorseless youths who were feared to 
be ‘muggers, killers, and thieves.’” 52 These “remorseless youths” were also referred 
to as “juvenile super-predators”—a term coined by Princeton professor John Dilulio 
that the American public quickly latched onto.53 
 Dr. Dilulio coined the term “super-predator” “to call public attention to what he 
characterized as a ‘new breed’ of offenders, ‘kids that have absolutely no respect for 
human life and no sense of the future . . . [they] are stone-cold predators!’”54 The 
media nearly immediately latched on to this idea, and through furthering and dissem-
inating the discussion, society as a whole latched on too.55 In hopes of winning ap-
proval from the public during this time and in order to do what they thought would 
be best for their constituents, politicians and policymakers nearly uniformly devel-
oped “tough on crime” platforms that resulted in harsher punishments and longer 
sentences for juvenile offenders.56 Dr. Dilulio himself even said, speaking about the 
nation as a whole: “by my estimate, we will probably need to incarcerate at least 
150,000 juvenile criminals in the years just ahead. In deference to public safety, we 
will have little choice but to pursue genuine get tough law-enforcement strategies 
against the super-predators.”57 This statement proved prophetic. 
 
 46.  Id. at 2. 
 47.  Tony Fabelo, An Overview of Texas Juvenile Justice Population Trends and Dynamics, CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE POLICY COUNCIL 2 (2000). 
 48. Texas Youth Commission, Agency Strategic Plan 2011-2015 (2010) 12, available at 
http://www.tjjd.texas.gov/about/TYC_Strategic_Plan_2011_to_2015.pdf. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  See generally Clyde Haberman, When Youth Violence Spurred ‘Superpredator’ Fear, THE NEW YORK 
TIMES (Apr. 6, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/07/us/politics/killing-on-bus-recalls-superpredator-
threat-of-90s.html?_r=0. 
 51.  James C. Howell, PREVENTING AND REDUCING JUVENILE DELINQUENCY: A COMPREHENSIVE FRAME-
WORK 4 (Sage Publications, 2nd ed. 2009). 
 52.  Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455 (2012) Amicus Brief 12. 
 53.  John J. Dilulio Jr., The Coming of the Super-Predators, THE WEEKLY STANDARD (Nov. 27 1995), 
http://www.weeklystandard.com/the-coming-of-the-super-predators/article/8160. 
 54.  Howell, supra note 51. 
 55.  Id. 
 56.  See generally id. 
 57.  Dilulio, supra note 53. 
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 The stories of “superpredators” drove many states, and Texas in particular, to 
utilize increasingly harsh measures, foregoing the rehabilitation ideal in favor of great 
dependence on juvenile facilities that resembled adult prisons featuring barbed wire, 
guards, and isolated cells. The theory behind the “tough on crime” movement was 
that the juveniles of America were “too far gone” and beyond the help or reform that 
rehabilitation or therapy could bring. As it unsurprisingly turned out, the idea of the 
“juvenile super-predator” never proved true; it was simply an unfounded myth that 
grabbed hold of society, producing detrimental effects.58 Although juvenile offenders 
often have some kind of mental disorder—and are sometimes genetically predisposed 
to such characteristics—the idea that a new generation of children was “born evil” 
was inaccurate and misleading. Despite its falsehood, the idea of the super-predator 
successfully catalyzed policymakers and the public into action because “it readily 
accessed the public’s hidden stereotype of the violent youth as someone who is dan-
gerous, living in a hopeless situation and not worthy of empathy or support.”59   
The extent and popularity of the resulting “tough on crime” movement cannot be 
overstated. Not only was the movement prevalent at the grassroots level, with indi-
vidual citizens advocating for harsher penalties for the corrupted youth, but even 
presidents fought the “war on crime” too. Beginning with Nixon, presidents took ac-
tion as far into their own hands as possible by consciously and actively painting a 
picture of their administrations as composed of incredibly resolute “crime-fight-
ers.”60 Indicative of the changes the Texas juvenile justice system specifically would 
soon see, Nixon argued that “doubling the conviction rate in this country would do 
more to cure crime in America than quadrupling the funds for [Hubert] Humphrey’s 
war on poverty.”61 And over time, the model supported by various presidential ad-
ministrations became so popular that tough sentences, harsher punishment, and the 
resulting loss of the rehabilitative ideal became the norm.62 
 Almost immediately, Texas enacted legislation aimed at expanding the treat-
ment of juveniles as adults (for purposes of both sentencing and punishment) and 
imposing determinate sentences and mandatory minimum periods of incarceration 
for juveniles convicted of certain violent or serious crimes.63 Texas also modified its 
laws to make easier the process of certifying juveniles to the adult criminal system—
meaning that juvenile offenders were being subjected to regimes that were originally 
conceived specifically for adults.64 The laws passed in Texas during the 1990s mon-
umentally expanded the punishments imposed on juveniles and transformed the ju-
 
 58.  Haberman, supra note 50. 
 59.  Kenneth A. Dodge, Framing Public Policy and Prevention of Chronic Violence in American Youths, 
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH (7th ed.). 
 60.  Gary Cohen, Punishment and Rehabilitation: A Brief History of the Texas Prison System, 75 Tex. B.J. 
604, 605 (2012). 
 61.  Benjamin Jealous et al., The Root: We Can’t Afford to Not Fix Justice, NAT’L PUBLIC RADIO (Apr. 7, 
2014), http://www.npr.org/2011/04/07/135203031/the-root-we-cant-afford-to-not-fix-justice-system. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Cohen, supra note 60. 
 64.  Shaw, supra note 30. 
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venile justice system into one quite different from its rehabilitation-focused prede-
cessor.  Much of what had been established by Morales v. Turman and in various 
community-based rehabilitation centers across the state was replaced with an ever-
increasing number of state-run confinement facilities housing an also ever-increasing 
number of juveniles. During this time, the population of juveniles in state-run lock-
ups in Texas reached more than 5,000.65 
 Much of the reform that both the national “tough on crime” movement and the 
specific work of the Texas legislature brought about was not initially intended to 
drastically affect juvenile offenders in the way that it ultimately did. The collective 
turning of a blind eye away from a more holistic approach to handling juvenile crime 
had grave and dramatic consequences.66 Although there was a pervasive obsession 
with the idea of the juvenile “super-predators,” the reforms were directed at the crim-
inal justice system, not specifically the juvenile justice system.67 However, in light 
of the process of certification, which involves juveniles being certified as adults and 
their cases being moved to the adult criminal justice system, the effects of the “get 
tough” reforms trickled down to the juvenile justice system.68   
The sharp increase in crime eventually tapered off (as was to be expected from 
the cyclical nature of crime rates), but the effects that the response to such an increase 
had on the juvenile justice system were much more enduring.69 The reduction in 
crime rates did not correlate to a cessation of “tough on crime” policies in Texas. In 
many ways, the response that Texas took to juvenile crime demonstrates how dam-
aging a reliance on a metric as fragile as crime rates can be—especially when that 
response included a use of secure state facilities, institutions on which a surfeit of 
evidence and research existed illustrating their damaging effects. Although the state 
of Texas, at the time, had arguably legitimate reasons for believing that becoming 
tougher on juvenile offenders would be successful, the reforms that the state made 
during the 1990s erupted in a juvenile just system wrought with injustice and corrup-
tion.  
The “tough on crime” policies ultimately resulted in a Texas juvenile justice sys-
tem that failed. It failed citizens who could no longer rely on the security of the fa-
cilities, it failed youth by not equipping them with the skills needed to turn from a 
life of crime toward becoming responsible, productive citizens, and it even failed 
taxpayers, by essentially training far too many youth to become hardened criminals—
ultimately costing taxpayers as juveniles go through a revolving door in the juvenile 
system and ultimately ‘graduate’ to adult prisons. The state’s response for over a 
decade was, sadly, static. It primarily featured confinement in large correctional fa-
cilities operated under a punitive system rather than a supportive, rehabilitative one. 
 
 65.  Maurice Chammah, Closing Corsicana: Lessons from a Juvenile Lock-Up, THE TEXAS TRIBUNE (Feb. 
12, 2014), http://www.texastribune.org/2014/02/12/corsicana-closure-lessons-juvenile-lock-/. 
 66.  See generally id. 
 67.  There had been an increase in crime rate among adult offenders as well. 
 68.  Certifying juveniles as adults to be tried in the criminal justice system is a vast topic, complicated with 
both moral and political considerations. A complete discussion of the process is beyond the scope of this Note. 
 69.  See generally Cohen, supra note 60. 
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The harsher and longer sentences enacted as a result of the reforms previously dis-
cussed consequently produced a system far too dependent on punishment and far too 
apathetic about understanding the root causes of crime, entrenched in the individual 
situations of the juvenile offenders themselves. The “tough on crime” movement 
caused two significant expansions. First, there was an expansion of opportunities to 
transfer youth to adult court (and therefore to adult prisons and jails) through certifi-
cation. Second, there was an expansion in the construction and use of state-run secure 
confinement facilities for juveniles who would not be charged as adults.  
Despite its widespread support throughout Texas, juvenile incarceration was 
both unwarranted and ineffective.70 “[O]verwhelming evidence [shows] that whole-
sale incarceration of juvenile offenders is a counterproductive public policy.”71 Se-
cure state facilities are often dangerous, ineffective, unnecessary, obsolete, wasteful, 
and inadequate, and institutionalization in general has the likely potential of “[harm-
ing] the well-being and [dampening] the future prospects” of the majority of juvenile 
offenders.72 Much of this has to do with the actual conditions of the facilities—over 
time, the facilities have become “exceedingly difficult to operate in a consistently 
safe and humane fashion.”73 Most significantly, the actual outcomes of correctional 
confinement are shockingly poor. Juveniles are often released back into the public as 
troubled as they were when they first entered confinement.74 
Although there is a clear public safety need for some kind of confinement, espe-
cially for those juveniles who have committed more serious crimes, the drawbacks 
and damaging consequences of Texas’ heavy reliance on secure state facilities are 
difficult to ignore. Poor conditions and high rates of recidivism aside, arguably the 
central concern raised by dependence on secure state facilities is how such depend-
ence undermines the very purpose of a juvenile justice system.  
The juvenile justice system was founded on the concept of rehabilitation through 
individualized justice.75 Its existence—its theoretical distinction from the adult crim-
inal justice system—rests on the idea that there is an inherent difference between a 
juvenile who commits a crime and an adult who commits a crime. While root causes 
of criminality may align, society has historically treated juvenile offenders as some-
how “different” from adult offenders for various reasons.76 The very age of juvenile 
offenders causes their cases to be even more subjective than an adult offender’s situ-
ation might be. For instance, the brains of juveniles are not yet fully developed.77 
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Juvenile brains lack the ability to regulate their own emotions, and they are still un-
dergoing changes to both their brain structure and their neural circuits.78 While juve-
niles’ cognitive functioning is similar to adults, their emotional development is not, 
and a stressful and terrifying experience—such as incarceration—is more difficult 
for them to process and bear than it would be for a normal-functioning adult.79 There-
fore, not only are juvenile offenders traumatized and oftentimes physically hurt as a 
result of incarceration, but they frequently are damaging mental consequences as 
well.80   
Moreover, as a juvenile offender’s delinquency is often caused or triggered by a 
situation or condition unique to him or her, there is inherent value in responding to 
those situations and conditions on a more individualized basis than secure state insti-
tutionalization allows. Another cause of criminality that would be better treated on 
an individualized basis is mental disorder. Incarceration in secure state facilities can 
have even more severe effects on a juvenile when he or she is mentally ill, a condition 
unfortunately quite common among juvenile offenders.81 While the presence of a 
mental disorder rarely provides a complete explanation of criminality, it is oftentimes 
a factor to be considered when trying to understand the root causes of a juvenile of-
fender’s criminal activity.82  
Until recent reform in Texas, the manner in which the juvenile justice system 
dealt with mental disorders was alarming, and is illustrative of many of the troubling 
issues that plagued the system for years. In an article entitled “Repeat Offenses in 
Texas Raise Questions over Release of Mentally Ill Juveniles,” The Associated Press 
discusses two unique and disturbing situations.83  One of the cases involves a sixteen-
year-old former juvenile detainee who was accused of stabbing a high school teacher 
to death with a butcher knife, and the other case involves a teenager who was con-
victed of killing a roofer during a robbery spree.84 Both offenders were released by 
the Texas Youth Commission because the agency was simply unable to treat their 
mental illness, and as required by law, forced to let them go.85   
As the article explains, “under a 1997 law meant to keep mentally ill juveniles 
from being held in detention centers where they cannot get proper treatment, youths 
in Texas who are serving indeterminate sentences and who have completed their min-
imum required time in custody are released to parents or guardians.”86 While it was 
arguably laudable for the Texas juvenile justice system to disallow such offenders to 
be housed in facilities where they cannot receive treatment, it seems illogical to 
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merely release juveniles who are troubled and ill back into society. There were no 
requirements for supervision upon release, and the Texas Youth Commission’s only 
option was to merely “recommend” that the juveniles receive treatment, and to refer 
them to their local Mental Health and Mental Retardation centers.87 They had no 
power to enforce such a recommendation, however.88 Although this law has since 
been changed, it represents the extent of not only the necessity for programs and 
services that are primarily dedicated to juvenile offenders and strictly focused on re-
habilitation, but also the dearth of options supporting rehabilitation that existed dur-
ing this era of Texas history.   
The severe rise in juvenile crime and consequent intensifying of policies focused 
on punishment led to a dependence on state-run facilities in Texas unmatched by any 
other state and by any other time period in Texas history. Increasing punitive 
measures failed to reduce criminal recidivism in the way that many thought it might, 
and instead led to a rapidly growing correctional system that strained government 
budgets, exploited taxpayer dollars, and worsened the conditions and lives of count-
less Texas youth.  
 While problems were by no means completely overlooked or accepted as un-
changeable, throughout the course of the 1990s and into the early 2000s there was no 
unified rallying force advocating for juvenile justice. The “tough on crime” move-
ment was not nearly as polarizing as it seems it should have been in hindsight, and it 
was not until the mid-2000s that the voices of family and youth advocates speaking 
out against the use of secure state facilities were finally heard. Simultaneously spark-
ing and reinforcing their pleas for justice was the uncovering of various scandals 
associated with the Texas Youth Commission that rendered the problems associated 
with the juvenile justice system impossible to ignore. 
 A news story published by The Texas Observer hit the stands on February 23rd, 
2007 which detailed serious allegations of child sexual abuse by staff members in 
various secure state institutions.  The story set the wheels in motion for deeply con-
cerned parents, youth and family advocates, and legislators across the state to begin 
the long process of voicing their concerns in hopes of bringing about much-needed 
reform.89 This particular news story ignited an upheaval of similar allegations (many 
of which proved to be true) from across the state.   
Journalists uncovered that in 2005, there had been sexual assault allegations at 
West Texas State School, but they were quickly covered up and no actions were taken 
to prosecute the accused.90 The Texas Observer news story explains how, following 
an investigation by the Texas Rangers and the FBI in early 2005, two of the highest-
ranking officials at that school—the assistant superintendent and the principal—were 
accused of having sexual relations with several students over an extended period of 
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time.91 At the time, “both men denied the allegations, but investigators collected doz-
ens of statements from students and staff, conducted polygraph tests on students, and 
collected DNA samples.”92 The two men had already resigned from their positions 
at the time The Texas Observer article was released, but then-current Director of the 
Texas Youth Commission was accused of helping cover up the scandals, along with 
several other high-ranking employees.93 The Texas Observer, however, obtained rec-
ords proving that the abuse was real, based on “internal agency documents [that] de-
scribe in considerable detail numerous incidents of sexual misconduct that Texas 
Youth Commission administrators were able to confirm at the facility.”94,95  
Thorough investigations at various state schools and the Texas Youth Commis-
sion itself ensued. Many of these investigations resulted in a “torrent of revela-
tions.”96 Simply stated, the original West Texas State School scandal of 2007 shed 
light on countless other issues that had silently plagued the juvenile justice system in 
Texas for years.97 The seriousness of the allegations against the Texas Youth Com-
mission, the fact that most of the allegations proved true, and the fact that it resulted 
in such a collective and purposeful unification of people concerned about the state of 
the Texas juvenile justice system meant that Texas needed to respond in a serious 
manner. To simply fire and hire new leaders at the Texas Youth Commission would 
have disappointed many and presumably would not have solved any real issues. The 
scandals would have to—and did—lead to a much-needed uprooting of the juvenile 
justice status quo. The key characteristic of the many changes that took place in re-
sponse to the Texas Youth Commission scandals was the shift in focus to keeping 
juvenile offenders in their communities, and to the extent that they had to be held in 
secure confinement, those institutions would be more purposefully designed to both 
confine and rehabilitate them.98 These shifts alone represented a monumental change 
from the focus on punishment and institutionalization that had dominated Texas since 
the mid-1990s, and they demonstrated a collective recognition that the system in 
place was quite dangerous to juvenile offenders.99 
C. 2007-2015 
 The brunt of the statutory changes from 2007 until 2015 came in the form of 
juvenile justice-related legislation passed in 2007, 2009, and 2011 during three con-
secutive Texas legislative sessions.100 The legislation passed during these three years 
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led to the current juvenile justice climate in Texas and to the major reform movement 
that occurred most recently in 2015. Much of the reform was grounded in ideas en-
capsulated by Governor of Texas Rick Perry’s statement in 2007: “I believe we can 
take an approach to crime that is both tough and smart. . . [T]here are thousands of 
non-violent offenders in the system whose futures we cannot ignore. Let’s focus more 
resources on rehabilitating those offenders so we can ultimately spend less money 
locking them up again.”101 By and large, Texas slowly but surely realized how much 
more could be done to make juvenile justice more ethical and effective.  
The first of the major statutory changes was Senate Bill (SB) 103 passed during 
the 83rd Texas Legislature in 2007 soon after details of the Texas Youth Commission 
scandals first broke.102 “Juvenile Justice in Texas: Where We’ve Been, Where We’re 
Headed” explains that, broadly speaking, the statutory reforms that Texas has passed 
since 2007 have “sought to ensure smaller populations, fewer abuses and better treat-
ment at lock-ups; to give children and teens fair hearings, sentences and representa-
tion in court; and to increase the focus on community-based treatment rather than 
state-administered incarceration.”103 SB 103 epitomized this most directly. It was an 
omnibus reform bill with three major goals: to address the abuse in state-run institu-
tions, to better the conditions and lower the populations in those institutions, and to 
move the state toward a community-based treatment model.104 In order to address the 
abuse in the secure state institutions, the bill called for a required additional 220 hours 
of training for officers working in the institutions.105 Additionally, the Office of In-
spector General and the Office of Independent Ombudsman were created to increase 
oversight of the institutions throughout the state.106 And lastly, a new advisory board 
was founded and its leadership structure was modified in order to ensure greater ac-
countability and communication between each level of every institution and the 
state.107  
In order to better the conditions for juveniles and to lower the populations in 
secure state institutions, the reform called for the segregation of children based on 
age and crime.108 It also stipulated that only juvenile offenders who committed felo-
nies could be committed to the Texas Youth Commission facilities, and juveniles 
who were charged with misdemeanors would be diverted to county-operated pro-
grams and services.109 Prior to this reform bill, countless juveniles were sent to secure 
state institutions even though they were nonviolent and had only committed misde-
meanors.110 SB 103 also stipulated that juveniles nineteen years and older would “age 
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out” of Texas Youth Commission facilities, either through probation or by transfer to 
adult prisons.111 As a result of the third main goal of SB 103—to move toward a more 
community-based treatment model—the use of community-based alternatives for ju-
venile offenders increased.112 This led to the expansion of county-based programs for 
both misdemeanants and felons in many of Texas’ largest counties.113  
The second wave of legislative reform aimed at helping and bettering the juvenile 
justice system came in 2009. The General Appropriations Bill led the state toward a 
community-based treatment model by creating additional grant programs that would 
provide incentives to keep youth in their community.114 The Legislature created fi-
nancial incentives in order to influence the prevalence and success of programs and 
services offered at the county level—as will be discussed shortly.115 Also in 2009, 
House Bill (HB) 3689 sought to better the conditions of secure state institutions 
through measures such as improving the mental health services that the Texas Youth 
Commission had to offer, by supporting reading programs for Texas Youth Commis-
sion students, and also by taking appropriate steps to improve the transition for juve-
niles reentering their communities.116 2009 also saw SB 1374, which established a 
pilot program as an alternative for nonviolent juvenile offenders.117 This was part of 
an effort to move toward sentencing, remediation, and representation that were more 
appropriate for the age of the offender and the crime he or she committed. Along the 
same lines, HB 1793 mandated that juvenile judges receive specific training, and SB 
518 sought to reduce the number of juveniles sent to adult court and to ensure that 
juveniles were receiving due process and treatment that fit their age and crime.118 
 The legislation passed in 2011 served to both further and strengthen past juve-
nile justice legislation. Major reforms during the 2011 legislative session included: 
more piloting of community-based treatment models, continuing the move toward 
more appropriate sentencing and remediation for juveniles, enhancing accountability, 
and streamlining administration. As part of the pilot program to develop more (and 
improved) community-based treatment models, HB 35 extended an already existing 
community pilot program designed to help children who were at risk of being placed 
in the child welfare or juvenile justice systems.119  To enhance accountability among 
the different branches and administrations of the Texas Youth Commission, SB 501 
served to create an interagency council that addressed racial, ethnic, and regional 
disparities across state agencies that serve children.120 This was in response to several 
youth advocacy programs and lobbyists.  
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Without question, the most significant juvenile justice bill in 2011 was SB 653. 
This bill created the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD), which is still in place 
today, through the merging of two different agencies—the Texas Youth Commission 
and the Texas Juvenile Probation Commission.121 This was not simply a renaming; 
it was the replacement of a broken, scandal-ridden system with one more progressive 
and ethical in both philosophy and action. SB 653 charged the newly formed TJJD 
with forming programs that would help detect delinquency earlier on in future of-
fenders.122 The TJJD was also charged with working to ensure that fewer kids who 
come into contact with the juvenile justice system are incarcerated, children who re-
main at home are given the opportunity to enter programs designed to help them 
avoid delinquency in the future, children who are incarcerated at the county level are 
kept close to their community, and children who must be sent to secure state institu-
tions have opportunities for rehabilitation.123 As its website explains: 
The Texas Juvenile Justice Department has a vision of providing safety for 
citizens of the State of Texas through partnership with communities and 
the delivery of a continuum of services and programs to help youth enrich 
and value their lives and the community by focusing on accountability of 
their actions and planning for a successful future.124 
County probation departments and courts are the backbone of the TJJD. All ju-
veniles who are referred to juvenile courts have services provided to them by proba-
tion departments operated by the counties.125 As the TJJD website explains, “county 
juvenile probation departments handle most of the sanctions and therapeutic inter-
ventions the courts may impose.”126 This represents the greater role that communi-
ties, and programs and institutions at the county-level in general, began to play as a 
result of the statutory changes. Deborah Fowler explains in “A True Texas Miracle” 
how the bill creating the TJJD prioritizes the use of community-based or family-
based programs and services for youth “over the placement or commitment of youth 
to a secure facility.”127 Moreover, it ensures that secure state facilities—that continue 
to exist “for youthful offenders that cannot be safely served in another setting” are 
more rehabilitative in nature than they were in the past.128  
 The creation of the Texas Juvenile Justice Department helped lead to more 
streamlined efforts to keep youth in their communities. SB 653 required that the TJJD 
struck a balance between the interests of rehabilitative needs and public safety and 
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created funding priorities without incentivizing incarceration.129  SB 653 also worked 
toward “[codifying] mechanisms to address juvenile infractions” that utilized the 
community-based alternatives more so than secure state institutions.130 Although, in 
all of these statutory reforms, the focus was on increasing the amount and quality of 
community-based rehabilitative institutions, SB 653 also laid out the goals and 
frameworks for smaller state-run lock-up facilities so that they would better promote 
youth rehabilitation than they had in the past. Lastly, SB 653 created additional grant 
programs that provided a financial incentive for counties to house and treat juvenile 
offenders in their communities.131 
As legislation such as SB 103 redirected juvenile offenders from state institutions 
to their communities, greater pressure fell on the individual counties to fund programs 
and institutions for the juveniles. All of a sudden, counties across the state had more 
juvenile offenders that they were responsible for and not enough resources to devote 
to their accommodation and rehabilitation. As “No Place for Kids: The Case for Re-
ducing Juvenile Incarceration” explains, in most states, “commitments to state cus-
tody are funded entirely with state funds, whereas local jurisdictions must foot the 
bill for community-based supervision and treatment programs.”132  This is not exactly 
true in Texas, where county programs are funded through a combination of state and 
local funds. Despite this, it is still cheaper for juveniles to be sent to state facilities.133 
Judges were often forced to make “an untenable choice between probation or incar-
ceration for adolescents with moderately serious offending histories who do not pose 
an immediate or significant threat to public safety.”134 For years, community-based 
rehabilitation was not a legitimate or feasible option for some youth. In light of the 
many statutory changes aimed at shifting more juveniles to communities instead of 
to state institutions, it became imperative for the state to eliminate the financial in-
centives that encouraged an overreliance on state institutionalization.  
As previously mentioned, a series of legislative initiatives shifted funds toward 
the counties, creating less of a financial disincentive for them to keep more juvenile 
offenders in their communities in non-residential programs or in rehabilitation-fo-
cused institutions, rather than send them to state correctional facilities.135 As Marc 
Levin and Jeanette Moll explain in “Comprehensive Juvenile Justice Reform: Cutting 
Costs, Saving Lives,” the Texas Legislature included a rider in the budget in 2009 
that “authorized the Texas Juvenile Probation Commission (TJPC) to fund grants to 
local juvenile probation departments that pledged to reduce commitments to TYC 
through the diversion of suitable juvenile offenders to community-based treatment 
and vocational programs.”136 These programs were required—by statute—to cost 
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less than half of the per-day cost of state lockups.137 Additionally, the law was written 
so that these programs were only funded if evidence from other jurisdictions using 
similar approaches was positive and ongoing results from the Texas programs them-
selves demonstrated an overall reduction in recidivism.138 
Fortifying the statutory changes and financial incentives for courts and correc-
tional systems to keep juvenile offenders in their communities was a statewide 
change in personal and public mindsets toward juvenile crime.139 Although the 2007 
Texas Youth Commission scandals served as the impetus for change to occur, people 
quickly saw the many dangers and drawbacks to incarcerating juveniles in secure 
state institutions—with the stories behind the scandals serving as their main source 
of information. People came to see that “the case against juvenile correction facilities 
is overwhelming. Countless studies and decades of experience show that these insti-
tutions are both dangerous and ineffective.”140 While this certainly is not true for 
every secure state institution in the country—nor should state institutions automati-
cally be labeled as “dangerous” or entirely punitive—there are benefits to commu-
nity-based rehabilitation programs that Texas as a whole has consistently acknowl-
edged and acted upon in recent years. This genuine change in mindset reinforced the 
changes in legislation and finances that have been occurring since 2007. During this 
time, remembering the jagged and complex history of the juvenile justice system in 
Texas became helpful to legislators, advocates, and even parents of juvenile offend-
ers. The 2007 Texas Youth Commission scandals caused people to realize the down-
ward spiral that the juvenile justice system has been on since the mid-1990s and, not 
only that, but to take action to reform the system to one more closely identified with 
its roots.141 In “Right on Crime: The Texas Model – Part II,” an article written by 
Stephen Lilienthal, Levin is quoted saying, “current reform efforts are returning us 
to policies that are more consistent with the history of the United States.”142 In this 
statement, Levin is referring to the rehabilitation model that Texas more or less hon-
ored until the mid-1990s (and the ensuing crime explosion and “tough on crime” 
movements that have been discussed).143 His statement highlights the cyclic nature 
of Texas’ juvenile justice system. The statutory changes and the shift in financial 
incentives would arguably not have occurred if advocates, parents, legislators, and 
others had not genuinely believed in the necessity for state and local courts and cor-
rection systems to invest in and expand access to intensive and high-quality alterna-
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II. A COMPREHENSIVE LOOK AT TEXAS SENATE BILL 1630 
 The advocacy and legislative efforts to address the corruption and dysfunction 
in the Texas Juvenile Justice Department eventually culminated in the passage of 
Senate Bill (SB) 1630.144 This bill solidified into law what so much of the drastic 
reform movements in Texas since 2007 had been leading to. SB 1630 focuses on 
shifting the entire Texas juvenile justice system away from the century-old “state 
model,” designed to place serious and non-serious offenders alike in high-security, 
state-run lockups, to a “regional model,” in which juvenile offenders are kept, when 
possible, in community-based facilities closer to their homes, in an environment fo-
cused on their rehabilitation.145 The bill relies heavily on a 2015 report created by the 
Council of State Governments Justice Center finding that system-involved youth de-
tained within their communities have better outcomes than youth sent to distant, 
state-run juvenile justice facilities. 
 SB 1630 requires the Texas Juvenile Justice Department (TJJD) to develop a 
plan for juvenile probation departments across the state to keep youth in regional 
facilities rather than committing them to TJJD facilities.146 Under the new model, 
youths will only be sent to state facilities if resources in their community cannot meet 
their needs.147 Essentially, the bill ensures that local juvenile probation departments 
continue to effectively serve youth, making it a requirement for the probation depart-
ment to use risk- and needs-assessments on youth immediately upon their entrance 
into the juvenile justice system.148 This means that each youth will be given the in-
dividualized focus and attention that he or she needs in order to become successfully 
rehabilitated and not prone to recidivism. The overarching requirement of this bill is 
for the success of the juvenile justice system “to be measured not only by the number 
of youth who reoffend but also by various factors indicative of youths’ well-being, 
such as family and community engagement.”149 
To make this more feasible, the bill expands the jurisdiction of the Office of the 
Independent Ombudsman (OIO), an external advocate for the rights of youth in cus-
tody.150 The expansion of this office will help address the great number of youth that 
will be held at the county level and ensure that there is greater oversight in the switch 
to this regional model.151 The bill would allow the OIO to investigate any complaints 
alleging that the rights of youths committed to post-adjudication facilities for juvenile 
offenders were being violated.152 The bill stems from two major trends: 1) all the 
corruption and resulting advocacy for change, and 2) the consistent and convincing 
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research that it would be far more effective to keep juvenile offenders in their com-
munities than in state-run institutions.  
Under the new regionalization plan proffered by SB 1630, each region would be 
required to operate defined, appropriate, research-based programs for youth.153 TJJD 
is required to consult with juvenile probation departments to identify capacity at post-
adjudication facilities operated by juvenile probation departments, counties, or pri-
vate operators that could help support the regionalization plan.154 That reorganization 
plan includes a budget review, redirection of staff, and funding mechanisms needed 
to support the plan.155 TJJD is even required to create a brand new division to admin-
ister the regionalization plan, monitor program accountability, and perform other 
functions, such as providing training, assisting in research-based program develop-
ment, and analyzing TJJD data in order to provide clear guidance to local probation 
departments on outcome measures.156  
One of the most major obstacles in supporting such a dramatic overhaul of the 
status quo is the issue of funding. SB 1630 addresses this issue too, however, by 
establishing a probation funding formula.157 Prior to SB 1630, TJJD was required to 
allocate annually state aid funds to juvenile boards to provide juvenile services. SB 
1630 requires TJJD to use the new formula for this purpose, with the intention of 
allotting as much money as is needed to ensure that the goals of SB 1630 can become 
a reality.158 The bill would also allow the Legislature to appropriate funds to initiate 
the regionalization plan in a way that actually generated savings to the state through 
a decreased population of youth detained in TJJD-operated secure facilities.159 Fur-
ther, TJJD would have to set aside a portion of its discretionary state aid appropria-
tions in order to fund projects with established recidivism reduction goals dedicated 
to serving specific populations based on risk and needs.160 Lastly, TJJD would reim-
burse counties for the placement of youth under the regionalization plan at a rate that, 
again, would offer savings to the state compared with the relative cost for detaining 
a juvenile at a secure facility.161  
Simply stated, SB 1630 would continue the successful reforms that the state of 
Texas has undertaken in its juvenile justice system over the past several years by 
ensuring that juveniles are sent to appropriate and safe programs where they will 
undergo treatment designed to help rehabilitate them rather than strictly punish them. 
By keeping juveniles closer to their communities, by increasing oversight, and by 
appropriating sufficient funds, Texas, through SB 1630 aims protect a vulnerable and 
large subset of its population and complete and maintain the successful reform of the 
juvenile justice system. 
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III. COMPARING AND ANALYZING ‘THE TEXAS APPROACH’ 
Given the comprehensiveness and progressive nature of SB 1630, the Texas ap-
proach to juvenile justice seems unquestionably commendable and on the fast track 
to success. The bill not only passed during the summer of 2015, which was an ac-
complishment in and of itself, but it received a great deal of praise across the board 
from families of juvenile offenders, legislators, various advocacy groups, and tax-
payers. Adjudging Texas’ true success in the realm of juvenile justice reform, how-
ever, entails not only comparing its present state to the corruption-riddled and pun-
ishment-obsessed past, but also comparing the state’s efforts with that of other states.  
Much of the reform initiated in Texas was modeled on reform that was—and 
is—in the process of occurring in Missouri.162 Similar to Texas, Missouri’s juvenile 
justice system took a turn for the worst in the mid-1990s as a result of escalating 
juvenile crime around the country and the subsequent explosive “tough on crime” 
reaction.163 But the state of Missouri, through an intense and still ongoing process of 
reform, “has created a juvenile justice system that has proved so successful over the 
last thirty years it is known as the ‘Missouri Miracle.’”164 Nearly thirty years ago, 
Missouri closed its training schools and, since then, the state’s Youth Corrections 
Agency has consistently produced better outcomes in the state than ever before, all 
without breaking the state’s budget.165 Similar to Texas, Missouri went about this 
process focused on offering a more humane, constructive, and positive approach to 
juvenile justice.166 Its system, impressively unique and progressive at the time (and 
still), is made up of small facilities, designed to hold between ten and thirty juveniles, 
located at sites throughout the state that keep young people close to their own 
homes.167 The facilities themselves are a far cry from the isolation rooms the state 
used to heavily rely on, and are now more group-focused and staffed by highly trained 
and educated individuals who treat the juveniles with respect and dignity.168 The re-
sults Missouri has witnessed speak for themselves: “fewer than 8 percent of the 
youths in the Missouri system return against after their lease, and fewer than 8 percent 
go on to adult prison.”169 Further, “one-third of the youths return to their communities 
with a high school diploma or GED, and another fifty percent successfully return to 
school.”170 Missouri continues to see such impressive results today. 
The crux of reform in Missouri—switching to the community-based alternative 
system rather than sending juveniles to far-flung state lock-ups—was the main source 
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of influence that the state had on Texas. SB 1630 made the Missouri approach to 
juvenile justice reform more of a reality in Texas by making it law that the default 
location for the vast majority of juvenile offenders would be community-based alter-
native facilities rather than state institutions. And the success that Missouri has had 
thus far in reducing recidivism and avoiding the corruption that so easily attaches to 
secure state institutions can thus serve as an indication of the probable success that 
the Texas juvenile justice system is likely to experience as well.  
On the opposite end of the spectrum, the Louisiana juvenile justice system re-
mains entrenched in the corruption-riddled and punishment-obsessed form that 
Texas, Missouri, and other states have strived so hard to escape.171 Similar to Texas 
and Missouri, and many other states following the nationwide “tough on crime” 
movement, before any reform efforts were considered in Louisiana, the reality of the 
situation in juvenile institutions across the state was as dire as one can imagine.172 
Regular reports of “gladiator-style fighting, guards molesting children, and a lack of 
basic education for kids as young as 14” gave Louisiana’s juvenile justice system the 
reputation as one of the worst in the country.173 Like Texas, the state had its work cut 
out for it, when, in 2003, the Louisiana Legislature passed sweeping reforms aimed 
at restructuring the juvenile justice system and transforming it into one that resembles 
the Texas system under SB 1630. Again like Texas, Louisiana’s intent was to whittle 
down the number of juveniles locked in sprawling, prison-like facilities and instead 
switch to relying on community-based services in order to help target the root causes 
of juvenile delinquency. 
On paper, Louisiana’s plan sounded promising and in tune with the reforms of 
its neighboring states who similarly had great need for an improved juvenile justice 
system. The Louisiana approach, compared with Missouri and Texas, however, 
proved too idealistic for the support and resources that were actually granted to it. 
Simply stated, while the reforms were commendable in theory, the state of Louisiana 
did not invest enough of its resources into the reformed, alternative methods of reha-
bilitating juvenile offenders.174 And to make matters worse, the state actually began 
building even more prison-like facilities following the legislation.175 Further, for the 
community-based alternatives that had enough resources to remain open, the condi-
tions there were not much better than the conditions in the prison-like, state-run fa-
cilities. Despite the intentional focus on rehabilitation, the Louisiana Office of Juve-
nile Justice provided inadequate monitoring of the community-based alternative 
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facilities.176 The forty-four facilities are not managed by the same organization, re-
sulting in no uniform oversight or monitoring system.177 This has resulted in ineffi-
ciency and abuse. While more juveniles have been sent to those alternative facilities 
than ever before, the severe lack of funding and the inadequacy of oversight resulted 
in an alternative option that was not actually an improvement from its predecessor.  
The present situation in Louisiana is as important for Texas to acknowledge and 
learn from as is the situation in Missouri, despite the great discrepancy in success 
levels between the two states. This is primarily because the case of Louisiana essen-
tially demonstrates what can potentially go wrong with reform plans of this style and 
size. The two main obstacles faced by Louisiana are genuine threats to Texas, Mis-
souri, and any other state that seeks to reform their juvenile justice systems to a re-
habilitative-focused, community-based alternative method. These obstacles relate to 
resources and oversight. 
First, a state’s true commitment to a piece of legislation becomes completely 
transparent when examining how much money is actually allotted to the furtherance 
of that legislation. In Texas, local jurisdictions have funded the community-based 
alternatives in a number of ways including: “state funds in the form of a line item in 
the budget or grants; Medicaid funding for some behavioral health services; Work-
force Investment Act dollars; grants form non-profit foundations that invest in juve-
nile justice; local government tax collection initiatives; and money saved from clos-
ing down juvenile facilities.”178 It is markedly more affordable to house juveniles in 
community-based alternatives than in secure state institutions, but for any kind of 
facility to function properly, there obviously has to be some sort of consistent and 
dependable source of funding.179 Fortunately, due to the nature of services provided 
by the community-based alternatives, there are several different sources of funding 
available. However, so much comes down to how much the state in particular is will-
ing to allocate. For instance, if a state is unwilling to allocate sufficient resources to 
community-based alternatives, but had little hesitancy allocating funds to fully state-
run lock-ups, it becomes questionable how invested the state actually is in pursuing 
rehabilitation-focused, community-based alternatives. In this realm in particular, 
where so much is dependent on government action, without the backing of the state, 
true reform would be hard to come by. 
Second, a major issue with the Louisiana system was the lack of organized over-
sight. The story of the Texas juvenile justice system during the mid-1990s until 2007 
depicts why oversight is so critical to a juvenile justice system. Its importance in 
protecting youth, enabling community involvement, monitoring and reporting on re-
form efforts, and fostering a legitimate and humane system cannot be overstated. 
While Louisiana surely was aware of the importance of oversight in the research 
compiled and considered before the passing of its reform legislation, the reality on 
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the ground indicated that oversight was not a priority. While some opponents to SB 
1630 in Texas argued that additional and clear oversight could perhaps be a burden, 
it is a far better situation to have too much oversight than too little. The situation in 
Louisiana makes that clear. The position of the OIO in the Texas Juvenile Justice 
Department—an office created with the sole purpose of it allowing one person (and 
his/her office) to oversee, in a uniform and strict manner) the inner workings of each 
institution and facilities, is critical to achieving the kind of reform sought by Texas 
and Louisiana alike.  
While more and more states have successfully shifted their ideologies away from 
a punishment/retribution ideal and to a more rehabilitation-focused mindset, the re-
sults have not always been promising, as indicated by the situations in Missouri and 
Louisiana, two states on opposite ends of the spectrum. Because, at this point, SB 
1630 is still being implemented across the state, it is not possible to conclusively 
declare what its success will be, though it is possible to make informed predictions. 
Because the juvenile justice system in Texas had become as corrupt and backwards 
of an institution as it did during the early 2000s, legislators, policymakers, and advo-
cates had their work cut out for them in terms of reform—more so than nearly all 
other states. But SB 1630 is not the first of its kind to attempt to shift the underlying 
principles of the juvenile justice system. Rather the bill is a culmination of a long 
lineage of similarly focused legislation, occurring every other year since 2007. Alt-
hough unfortunate in some ways that it took nearly eight years for a piece of legisla-
tion like SB 1630 to pass, its success is made even more probable by the fact that it 
considers all of the legislation that the three preceding legislative sessions have pro-
duced. The two most pressing concerns for reform in this realm, resources and over-
sight, are more accounted for with SB 1630 than would have been possible had pre-
vious legislation not paved the way. 
SB 1630 has successfully put into place a much-needed regional model that has 
the potential to serve juvenile offenders better than ever before. In allowing more 
youth to be closer to home, have youth receive mental or drug treatment that they 
need, and maintaining a focus on safety and accountability, SB 1630 has the extreme 
potential to place Texas on solid ground in terms of having a juvenile justice system 
that is stable, transparent, and effective.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
 Riddled with corruption and full of neglect, abuse, and cruel and unusual pun-
ishment, the Texas juvenile justice system reached a point where it could prolong 
dramatic reform no longer. Although juveniles in the system were mistreated for 
years, largely due a nationwide “tough on crime” movement catalyzed by spikes in 
the national juvenile crime rate, it took until a serious scandal leaked in 2007 for 
enough attention to be gained by advocates, legislators, and policymakers for any real 
and lasting change to be made. In 2007, when allegations of extreme corruption and 
abuse at a heavily populated Texas secure state juvenile institution proved true, the 
stage was set for a series of legislation aimed at completely reforming the entire ju-
venile justice system from the ground up. These reform efforts culminated in Senate 
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Bill 1630, which went into effect in September of 2015. This progressive bill focuses 
on two main goals: first, switching the Texas juvenile justice system to a regional 
model rather than a state model, wherein juvenile offenders are kept in facilities in 
their communities rather than far away in prison-like state-run lock-ups, and, second, 
within those facilities, placing a far greater emphasis on rehabilitation rather than on 
punishment.  
 While it is too soon to know definitively just how successful this new model 
will be, based on past experience, through examining the purpose and language of 
the bill itself, and comparing the newest reform bill with efforts in different states, it 
is clear that this model has a high probability of being exceptionally effective. Mis-
souri and Louisiana are both states similar to Texas in that the histories of their juve-
nile justice systems are comparably filled with corruption and an extreme focus on 
punishment. Of the two, however, only Missouri has actually experienced success 
and a truly reformed juvenile justice system. Properly leaning on the Missouri model 
and striving to avoid the mistakes made through the Louisiana model, Texas seems 
to be in remarkably good shape in terms of ensuring that the progressive and well-
meaning intent behind and language of SB 1630 will be appropriately implemented 
and maintained in the years to come.   
 
